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ABSTRACT 
 
We argue that the strategy literature has been virtually silent on the issue of recessions, and 
that this constitutes a regrettable sin of omission. A key route to rectify this omission is to 
focus on how recessions affect investment behavior, and thereby firms stocks of assets and 
capabilities which ultimately will affect competitive outcomes. In the present paper we aim to 
contribute by analyzing how two key aspects of recessions, demand reductions and reductions 
in credit availability, affect three different types of investments: physical capital, R&D and 
innovation and human- and organizational capital. We point out that recessions not only affect 
the level of investment, but also the composition of investments. Some of these effects are 
quite counterintuitive. For example, investments in R&D are more sensitive to credit 
constraints than physical capital is. Investments in human capital grow as demand falls, and 
both R&D and human capital investments show important nonlinearities with respect to 
changes in demand.  
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INTRODUCTION 
One surprising realization that came out of the financial crisis of 2008-9 was that the 
strategy literature has very little to say on the subject of recessions and business cycles 
(Agarwal, Barney, Foss, & Klein, 2009; Bromiley, Navarro, & Sottile, 2008; Latham & 
Braun, 2011; Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989). We can only speculate why this is the case. One 
possible reason is that the coming of age of the strategy field occurred in an unusually stable 
period, so it did perhaps not seem as important as exploring the opportunities opened up by 
the resource and capabilities view, the knowledge based view of the firm, NK-landscapes, etc. 
In addition, the empirical findings of a small year effect in the variance decomposition 
literature may further have strengthened the notion that research opportunities were greater 
elsewhere (e.g. McGahan & Porter, 2002). Since then events have shown us that recessions 
are not always mild, not always far between, and can have profound impact on the 
competitive process and its outcomes.  Recessions seem to be too important to ignore for a 
field that purports to understand competitive behavior and competitive outcomes.  
Given the interest the field of strategy has devoted to understanding competitive behavior - 
and how competitive behavior is influenced by forces in firms’ external environment - the 
strategy literature would seem a natural place to look for insights into how recessions affect 
firm behavior. What little we do know seems to be knowledge generated as a byproduct of 
research in other fields that are not primarily interested in firm level competitive behavior and 
outcomes per se, but have generated such knowledge in order to understand aggregate effects 
better (e.g. macroeconomics), or to understand the implications of recessions for financial 
decisions and financial markets (e.g. finance).   
Our goal here falls short of developing a complete strategic theory of recessions and 
business cycles. Instead our more modest aim is to contribute by laying some of the 
groundwork for such a theory by synthesizing and conceptualizing a crucial piece of the 
knowledge that would need to go into such a theory. This knowledge is (by necessity) mostly 
taken from outside the strategy field. The subject matter we focus on is investment behavior, 
in particular we examine and contrast how recessions affect investments in tradable (Barney, 
1986) and non-tradable (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) assets.  
The hallmark of recessions (and more generally business cycles) is changes in investment 
levels and investment behavior. Also, the strategy literature has since the 1990s placed 
accumulation and acquisition of resources and capabilities at the center in terms of 
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understanding competitive behavior and outcomes. Recessions affect these processes via 
changes in firms’ investment behavior. Therefore it seems logical to make changes in 
investment behavior a key point of departure for building a strategic theory of recessions. We 
devote special attention to knowledge investments due to the almost universally accepted 
primary importance of knowledge stocks in determining competitive outcomes (Barney, 1991; 
Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Wernerfelt, 1984). Understanding how recessions affect knowledge 
stocks via changes in investment behavior, is presumably of particular value to strategy 
researchers. 
To get some traction on the link between recession and knowledge investments we split 
knowledge investments into different types of knowledge stocks, specifically investments in 
R&D and innovation, and investments in human- and organizational capital. To simplify the 
terminology we will we will refer to the former as R&D and the latter as human capital 
investments. A key distinction between the two is that R&D and innovation is primarily 
oriented at creating new knowledge, while investments in human- and organizational capital 
primarily deals with acquiring, disseminating and exploiting existing knowledge. As we 
elaborate below there are important differences between how these two categories of 
knowledge investments are affected by recessions. We also examine investments in physical 
assets, partly to form a contrast to knowledge assets, but also because giving prominence to 
non-tradable assets does not imply that we believe tradable assets can safely be ignored. 
Moreover, and equally important, we split the effects of recessions into demand reductions 
and problems with access to credit. Both of these are relevant in most recessions, but firms 
may experience them in different degrees and different combinations (Tong & Wei, 2008). 
We separate these two in order to analyze whether their effects on the different types of 
investments vary.  
Our analysis generates the following predictions. First, R&D investments will be less 
sensitive to demand reductions than physical investments, and more sensitive to internal 
finance. Second, firms will prefer increasing debt to cutting investments in R&D, and R&D 
investments are therefore more sensitive to binding credit constraints than are physical 
investments. This implies that credit market imperfections may have greater effects on 
competitive dynamics than usually assumed in the strategy literature, since it hampers firms’ 
ability to fund R&D investments, and because firms differ in their dependence of- and access 
to credit. Third, human capital investments are stimulated by mild demand reductions, but for 
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strong demand reductions they decrease, and notably, they also decrease for firms that 
experience increases in demand. This implies that there are important nonlinearities in the 
relationship between demand and human capital investments.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: First we present a general theory of how 
firms’ investments are affected by changes in demand and credit, and apply this to physical 
investments. With this as the standard apparatus we then contrast physical investments with 
investments in R&D and innovation, and subsequently with investments in human- and 
organizational capital. In each section we formulate propositions about effects of changes in 
demand and credit on investments, and also about differences across asset types with respect 
to these effects. We close the paper with conclusions and implications. 
 
INVESTMENTS IN RECESSIONS: A GENERAL APPROACH 
While recessions differ in their specific causes, intensity and duration, some common 
features are present in most recessions, in particular reductions in demand and reductions in 
access to credit. Both are relevant in most recessions, but firms may experience them in 
different degrees and in different combinations (Tong & Wei, 2008). For example, the bank 
channel has been designated as particularly important in depressing investments (Bernanke & 
Gertler, 1989, 1990) causing firms and industries that are particularly dependent on credit to 
cut deeper in investments than those that are less dependent, even controlling for investment 
opportunities (Braun & Larrain, 2005; Campello, 2003).  
The business cycle literature in economics and finance provide ample evidence of the 
strength of the aggregate effects of recessions. For instance, when lenders experience an 
adverse shock or a mounting fear of future losses, they reduce lending and raise interest rates 
(Chava & Purnanandam, 2011). Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) find that in the US during the 
financial crisis of 2008, new loans to large borrowers fell by 79% relative to the peak of the 
boom, and that the volume of loans for real investments fell by 72% relative to the peak level 
in 2007. Gilchrist and Sim (2007) estimate that 50- 80% of the drop in investment during a 
recession is due to financial factors that constrain firms’ ability fund investments. Gan (Gan, 
2007) estimate that the same measure was 20% after the burst of the housing bubble in Japan 
in the early 1990s. Liquidity in capital markets is thus pro-cyclical with the cost and scarcity 
of capital increasing in recessions (e.g. Acharya & Viswanathan, 2011; Bernanke & Gertler, 
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1989; Bernanke, Gertler, & Gilchrist, 1996; Eisfeldt, 2004; Eisfeldt & Rampini, 2006; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1992). In sum, then, recessions may cause serious distortions in both the 
level and composition of investment - factors that are important to competitive behavior and 
ultimately competitive outcomes.  
To illustrate the general effect of reductions in demand and reductions in access to credit 
we draw on Gertler and Hubbard (1988) and Hubbard (1997). Figure 1 shows the relationship 
between a firm’s demand for capital and the supply of capital it faces. The quantity of 
investments is on the horizontal axis while the cost of capital is on the vertical axis. The 
demand curve, D, illustrate demand for capital by the firm, and is downward sloping as lower 
capital costs increases the desired level of investments. The location of the demand curve is 
determined by the expected future profits of the investments. The supply curve, S, illustrate 
the supply of capital to the firm. As firms will finance some (or all) of their investments using 
internal funds, the supply curve is horizontal to the point CF, which is the firms’ cash flow. 
From here, external capital is needed to fund further investments. The cost of internal funds is 
depicted as r, the risk adjusted market rate of return (which is the opportunity cost of internal 
funds)1. The slope of the curve of external capital (the S-curve from CF and onwards) 
depends on how much the creditors must be compensated for risk, and will be upward sloping 
since increasing debt increases the risk to credit suppliers – which they must be compensated 
for. The equilibrium investments are It=0 where the expected marginal profitability of capital 
equals the marginal interest rate.  
The effect of changes in demand on investments  
Changes in demand can affect firms’ investments, one is by changing the investment 
opportunities, and the other by reducing profits and thus access to internal funding. We start 
with the former.  
A reduction in the expected future profit of investments causes the demand-curve to shift 
inwards, while an increase makes it shift outwards. The rather unsurprising result of an 
reduction in investment opportunities is a new equilibrium with reduced investment and 
reduced demand for credit. Conversely, an increase in investment opportunities will make 
firms increase their investments. Figure 1 show how a reduction in investment opportunities 
causes the firms to reduce their investments. 
                                                          
1  The cost of internal capital (r) is here shown as a horizontal line, indicating that a firm can invest its internal 
capital outside the firm (in the market).  
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[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Changes in demand conditions can also affect firms’ investments via their access to 
internal funding, i.e., their cash flow. This effect is illustrated in figure 2 as a shift in the cash 
flow from CF to CFt=1, which causes the supply curve, S, to shift inwards. After this shift 
external sources are needed to fund a larger portion of its investments. The upward slope of 
the external part of the supply curve means that the cost of investments are now higher, and 
this reduces the desired level of investments as illustrated in Figure 2. Obviously, an increase 
in the cost of internal capital (r), for example because of an increase of the risk free rate of 
return and/or an increase in the risk premium, will cause an upward shift in the S curve and 
reduce the investment. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
Physical capital 
The general theory is best illustrated with investments in physical capital. A fall in demand 
drives down capacity utilization, driving down the expected profitability of physical 
investments. This in turn will cause the demand for capital curve (D) to shift inwards and 
investments to be reduced. An additional effect shifting D inwards is the option value 
associated with postponing investments in times of uncertainty (Bernanke, 1983).  Bernanke 
(1983) argues that an option value on awaiting new information is created when investment 
are associated with some degree of irreversibility - and new information relevant to assess the 
long-run return of an investment arrives over time. Firms are better off waiting for new 
information if improved information is more valuable than the short-term return of 
undertaking the investments immediately. The option value will be inversely related to the 
time span needed to activate the investment. 
The other main effect is that a negative demand shock reduces a firms’ cash flow and 
thereby also their access to internal funds. This implies an inward shift supply of capital curve 
(S) and a negative effect on physical investments. 
 
The effect of reductions in access to credit on investments 
In figure 3 we show the effect of reduced credit availability. This makes the S-curve 
steeper, as capital providers demand larger compensation for providing funds. The marginal 
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cost of credit is upwards sloping, and the steepness of the curve depends on a) the value of 
collateral and b) lenders perceived risk (Fazzari, Hubbard, & Petersen, 1988). Both a) and b) 
may cause the S-curve to become steeper in recessions. Collateral becomes less valuable 
because assets are expected to generate less profit (Bernanke & Gertler, 1990), perceived risk 
increases due to the general spike in uncertainty. Following the rotation of the supply curve, 
the firm has to pay a higher price for its external funds, and the desired level of investments 
decline.  
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
Physical capital  
Two central features of physical investments are important when looking at the effect of 
reduced access to credit. The first is that some portion of physical capital is normally financed 
by credit. The second is about the steepness of the curve. Physical investments are tangible 
assets that work better as collateral than intangible assets. There is also relatively less 
uncertainty related to the outcome of investment in physical capital than intangible capital. 
While physical capital is normally purchased via market transactions where price and quality 
is (more or less) known ex ante, intangible capital involves accumulation processes whose 
outcome are uncertain (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982). Both these points imply that the supply 
curve for external finance will be less steep for physical assets than for intangible assets, and 
also that the steepness will increase relatively less in periods of recessions.  
 
Net effects of recessions on investments in physical capital 
As seen, the effects of reductions in demand- and in access to credit both work in the same 
direction. Demand fall in recessions will lower the incentives for firms to invest in new 
capacity, while reduced access to credit will lower firms’ ability to finance new physical 
investments externally. Theory thus implies that physical investments should be pro-cyclical. 
However, the ability to access finance will only affect investments for firms with incentives to 
invest in physical capital, which implies that demand reductions are likely to have a larger 
effect on physical investments than reductions in access to credit.  
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] 
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R&D INVESTMENTS IN RECESSIONS 
So far, we have merely looked at the “classical” theory of physical investments and not 
made any distinction between different asset types. However, differences across asset types 
will affect the placement and shape of the demand- and supply curves in the general model, 
and also the way the curves shift in a recession. We therefore examine investments in two 
other categories; investments in R&D and human capital. We let R&D refer to all R&D-
activities and process and product innovation, and human capital investments encompass 
investments in training of employees and organizational development programs. In the 
following we examine how these two categories of investments are affected by recessions, 
and the differences between these and physical investments. 
 
The effect of reductions in demand on knowledge capital investments 
As with physical investments, reductions in demand will have two distinct effects, one by 
altering investment opportunities and one by reducing firms’ cash flow. We start with the 
former. 
Changes in investment opportunities 
Investments in R&D and innovation are long-term investments that are more difficult to 
scale up and down than investments in physical capital. If you cut in R&D, you are unlike to 
be able to scale investments back up quickly (Li, 2011). A large portion of investments in 
R&D is related to paying scientists and engineers, and a considerable share of the new 
knowledge will exist in the form of tacit, highly specialized and firm specific knowledge 
carried by these workers, or embedded in teams (Hall, 2010). Laying off this type of 
personnel is costly, because valuable knowledge investments will be lost, and because R&D 
productivity cannot easily be restored by hiring replacement when demand picks up. As a 
direct result of this, firms smooth their R&D investments over time to avoid having to lay off 
the workers who embed the knowledge (Hall, 2010). Put differently, R&D investments have 
higher adjustment costs than physical capital  (Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee, & Manova, 
2010; Hall, Blanchard, & Hubbard, 1986), and will therefore be less sensitive to transitory 
fluctuations in demand (Hubbard, 1997).  
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A further argument is the option value discussed above (Bernanke, 1983). As noted the 
option value will be inversely related to the time span needed to activate the investment. As 
the time span for building for instance plants or buying equipment is relatively short 
compared to R&D projects,  the option value of waiting is relatively low for R&D 
investments (Ghemawat, 2009).  
In sum this implies that the share of knowledge investments to physical investments should 
be countercyclical (Aghion & Saint-Paul, 1991; Bean, 1990; Bloom, 2007; Gali & Hammour, 
1993) which basically means that firms’ cut R&D investments proportionally less than 
physical investments:  
Proposition 1: R&D investments will be less sensitive to demand reductions than physical 
investments 
 
Investments in R&D have a two component cost structure where one component is out-of-
pocket-costs, and the other is the opportunity cost of personnel and other resources involved. 
The opportunity cost dimension creates important differences between knowledge 
investments and physical capital. The pit-stop view of recessions (Aghion & Saint-Paul, 1991; 
Davis & Haltiwanger, 1990; Gali & Hammour, 1993; Hall, 1991) claims that the opportunity 
costs of using idle labor resources in R&D are much lower in periods of low capacity 
utilization. In fact, under low capacity utilization this opportunity cost can drop to zero. Under 
high capacity utilization, the opportunity cost of using personnel in R&D is the value of the 
output they could have produced if they were assigned to production. The upshot from this is 
that R&D become more attractive during recessions. Note that there is no equivalent pit-stop 
effect for physical capital. 
Proposition 2: The higher the value from reallocating idle employees to R&D, the more 
demand reductions will stimulate R&D-investments 
 
Reduced access to internal finance 
The second effect of reduced demand on R&D is by reducing firms’ cash flow and thereby 
access to internal funding. R&D investments are more costly to finance externally (elaborated 
below), and such investments will therefore primarily be financed internally (Bertoni, 
SNF Working Paper No 03/13 
 
10 
 
Colombo, & Croce, 2010; Bougheas, Görg, & Strobl, 2003; Carpenter & Petersen, 2002; 
Czarnitzki & Hottenrott, 2011; Müller & Zimmermann, 2009; Ughetto, 2008). There is 
considerably uncertainty related to the output of knowledge investments (Hall, 2010), and 
more uncertain projects are less attractive to credit providers. The reason for this is that 
lenders cannot benefit from the upside of the projects, while equity investors can. So while 
lenders lack the upside potential, they are confronted with the downside of R&D projects, 
which may be considerable. The output from R&D investments is usually both intangible and 
characterized by high specificity, making the salvage value low if the project should fail 
(Gugler, 2001). Also, the levels of information asymmetries associated with investments in 
new knowledge are higher than for other types of investment (Hall, 2002), and finally, the low 
initial cash flow from the innovation projects may be insufficient to cover interest rates on a 
loan (Gugler, 2001).  
All the above implies that the capital supply curve is steeper for knowledge investments 
than for physical investments, and also that the steepness will increase in recessions, when 
uncertainty increases. For this reason R&D investments are quite sensitive to the availability 
of internal finance, as several empirical studies have found (e.g. Bertoni et al., 2010; Bhagat 
& Obreja, 2011; Bhagat & Welch, 1995; Brown, Fazzari, & Petersen, 2009; Hall, 1992; 
Harhoff, 1998; Himmelberg & Petersen, 1994; Rafferty, 2003). 
Proposition 3: R&D investments are more sensitive to internal finance than physical 
investments 
 
Integrated effects of changes in investment opportunities and access to internal finance 
The discussion above implies that the relationship between demand reduction and R&D 
investments is non-linear. Regarding the form of this linearity, we reason as follows: For mild 
reductions in demand, the opportunity costs of investing in R&D will fall, stimulating R&D 
investments. The strength of this effect will depend on the value of utilizing non-R&D 
personnel in R&D activities (cfr. P2). However, at a certain level of demand reduction, the 
cash flow of the firm is so diminished that it needs external finance to fund its investments 
(cfr. P3). The weak collateral and high risk R&D investments pose to creditors, makes it 
difficult to fund the desired investments. From this point on, the cash flow effect will 
dominate the opportunity cost effect, and demand reductions will have an increasingly 
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negative impact on R&D investments. The above discussion can be summarized as tracing out 
a negative cubic function as illustrated in Figure 5:  
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE] 
 
Proposition 4: The relationship between changes in demand and R&D investments is a 
negative cubic function 
The effect of reductions in access to credit on R&D investments  
As noted, when a negative demand shock occurs, firms that are able to finance R&D and 
innovation from earnings will tend to maintain these investments, while firms that are unable 
to do so must either cut investment or increase borrowing. Due to the high adjustment costs of 
knowledge investments, firms will prefer increasing debt to cutting investments in R&D and 
innovation. The reason why firms would rather increase debt than cut R&D investment, even 
if credit is expensive, is that loans can be repaid, refinanced or substituted with new equity 
when conditions allow it. A crippled R&D department may take years to rebuild. There is in 
other words an essential difference in reversibility between the two options, leading firms to 
prefer an increase in debt.  
Proposition 5: Firms will prefer increasing debt to cutting investments in R&D 
 
If firms prefer to increase debt over cutting R&D (P5), credit constrained firms will be the 
ones that cut these investments most, while unconstrained firms will borrow to maintain them 
(Aghion, Askenazy, Berman, Cette, & Eymard, 2008). Paradoxically, then, even though R&D 
investments are not usually financed by credit, these investments are quite sensitive to 
increasing credit constraints in a recession. The reason being that credit constrained firms 
cannot turn to credit to maintain R&D. Many studies have investigated this empirically and 
found that credit constraints do indeed affect R&D investments negatively (e.g. Canepa & 
Stoneman, 2008; Gorodnichenko & Schnitzer, 2010; Mancusi & Vezzulli, 2010; Mohnen, 
Palm, van der Loeff, & Tiwari, 2008; Paunov, 2012; Savignac, 2008; Schneider & Veugelers, 
2010)  
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If we compare R&D investments with physical investments, it is clearly easier to finance 
physical investments by credit given lower information asymmetries, higher collateral value, 
etc. The counterintuitive conclusion from this is that credit constraints will actually have a 
lager negative impact on R&D investments than physical investments. Due to the larger 
adjustment cost of R&D investments firms have a stronger incentive to turn to credit when 
internal finance is insufficient, than they have for physical investments. This makes R&D 
investments more, not less, sensitive to credit availability.   
Proposition 6: Firms R&D investments are more sensitive to credit constraints than their 
physical investments  
 
Net effects of recessions on knowledge investments 
The opportunity costs argument implies that firms should be more willing to invest in 
R&D during recessions, while the financial constraints (both internal- and external) argument 
states that intangible investments should be more difficult to finance during recessions, So, 
which of the two dominate?  
There is considerable empirical (macro-level) evidence that the absolute level of R&D 
investments is procyclical, implying that the reduced cash flow effect dominates the pit stop 
effect (e.g. Barlevy, 2007; Comin & Gertler, 2006; Fatas, 2000; Filippetti & Archibugi, 2010; 
Geroski & Walters, 1995; Ouyang, 2011; Wälde & Woitek, 2004). Another set of studies has 
investigated the relative sizes of the opportunity cost- and the financial constraints effect on 
knowledge investments. Aghion et al. (2008) use a panel of French firms in the period 1993-
2004 to analyze the relationship between financial constraints and firms investments in R&D 
over the business cycle. Their main findings are that R&D investments as a share of total 
investments are countercyclical for firms that do not face financial constraints, while they 
become more pro-cyclical as the credit constraints increase. They also find that the latter 
result is magnified in sectors that rely heavily on external finance. These results indicate that 
in the presence of credit constraints, the effects of financial constraints dominate the 
opportunity costs effect. Lopez-Garcia, Montero and Moral-Benito (2012) and Bovha Padilla, 
Damijan and Konings (2009) also find that R&D investments are countercyclical for firms 
without credit constraints and pro-cyclical for constrained firms (for Spanish- and Slovenian 
firms respectively).  
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Summing up, financial constraints (internal and external) have a stronger negative effect 
on R&D investments than the positive effect of reduced opportunity costs. The above studies 
suggest that this can explain the observed pro-cyclical behavior of the absolute level of R&D 
investments on the macro level. Similarly R&D investments are less sensitive to changes in 
demand than physical investments, due to the higher adjustment cost and the opportunity cost 
effect.   
 
HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENTS IN RECESSIONS 
The effect of reductions in demand on human capital investments 
When demand falls, some human capital is likely to become underutilized. Firms have two 
options regarding this excess human capacity. One option is to reduce the number of 
employees to compensate for the excess capacity created. This will cut costs in the short run. 
However, if the demand fall is expected to be temporary, firms will have to rehire employees 
to scale their capacity back up, which in turn implies new costs related to searching, hiring 
and training the new employees. The other option is to hoard labor, that is, keep the 
employees in periods when there is not enough work. This will increase costs in the short run, 
but the firm will avoid costs of searching, hiring and training new employees if and when 
demand rises again (Becker, 1962; Oi, 1962; Rosen, 1966). The pit-stop argument also works 
in favor of labor hoarding since the firm can use the excess capacity of employees on training 
and solving organizational problems, thus increasing the firms stock of human capital.  
The more specialized the employees are, the more expensive (and difficult) it will be to 
rehire workers, and the more likely it becomes that the firm will hoard labor.  In addition, the 
amount of uncertainty related to when (and if) demand will readjust to pre-crisis levels will 
also affect the incentives for labor hoarding. Bloom et al (2007) find that higher levels of 
uncertainty lead to preference for the status quo (doing as before), which in this context is 
keeping employees who might be costly to replace later.   
 
Changes in investment opportunities  
Similar to knowledge capital, human capital investments have a two component cost 
structure, where one component is the out of pocket costs associated with training employees 
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(e.g. an external course), and the other is the opportunity costs associated with taking an 
employee out of her ordinary work. Reductions in demand increase the level of excess 
capacity, which lowers the opportunity costs of human capital investments, and this gives 
firms stronger incentives to invest in such activities. Human capital investments thus become 
“cheaper” when demand falls, and the demand curve (D) will shift outwards due to the 
positive shift in investment opportunities. This implies a positive effect of demand reductions 
on human capital investments. This notion of recessions as reorganizations is supported by 
several studies advocating the pit-stop view (Aghion & Saint-Paul, 1991; Caballero & 
Hammour, 1996; Davis & Haltiwanger, 1990; Hall, 1991).  
Compared to R&D investments, the opportunity cost component as a share of total costs 
will be larger for human capital investments, and the pit-stop effects of recessions will 
therefore be relatively stronger than for R&D.   
Changes in access to internal funding 
Reductions in demand reduce firms’ cash flow and thereby also their access to internal 
funding. If the fall in cash flow is very large and the firm ends up in a liquidity squeeze, it 
may be forced to abandon labor hoarding and turn to layoffs.  
Empirical studies of job creation and destruction over the business cycle find that the rate 
of job destruction increases in recessions, while job creation is rather unresponsive to the 
business cycle (e.g. Davis & Haltiwanger, 1990). However, while there is net job destruction 
in recessions, much of this activity takes place within a relatively small number of firms that 
make large cutbacks (Davis & Haltiwanger, 1990). This again indicates that the fall in 
demand has to be of a certain size before a firm starts laying off employees in response to a 
demand shock it believes will be temporary.  
Based on the above findings, changes in demand should have a non-linear relationship to 
human capital investments. Reduced opportunity costs associated with training employees 
when excess capacity rises, increase firms’ incentives to invest in human capital. This effect 
will increase up to a point where the cost of carrying excess capacity becomes too high, that 
is, when the expected gains from retaining and training employees will be lower than the 
forgone savings from layoffs, and the firm will increasingly turn to layoffs. This, in turn, 
reduces human capital investments. Conversely, the opportunity costs of training and 
investments in organizational capital increases when demand increases, and investments 
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should then fall (Bean, 1990). For sufficiently large increases the firm will have to start 
hiring, which will tend to drive the need for training upwards. The change in investments in 
training and organizational capital should therefore be a negative cubic function of demand 
problems. I.e. if demand increases, investments should fall. If demand is reduced, investments 
should initially increase, but eventually decrease (for sufficiently large reductions in demand) 
as firms turn to layoffs instead of labor hoarding. Similar to R&D investments this pattern is 
what a negative cubic function traces out (See Figure 6), but the nonlinearity is stronger for 
human capital investments because the opportunity cost effect is stronger, and the credit 
effects are weaker.  
Proposition 7: The relationship between changes in demand and human capital 
investments is a negative cubic function, and the nonlinearity is stronger than for R&D 
investments  
 
The effects of reductions in access to credit on human capital investments 
Capital market imperfections are less relevant for human capital investments than for 
investments in R&D- and physical capital. The major costs component of human capital 
investments is the opportunity costs of time spent on training, rather than the actual out-of-
pocket costs. Also, human capital investments are considered to be maintenance or 
development of existing knowledge, so the salvage value of such investments will be very 
low, if any at all. These investments are therefore more likely to be financed internally than 
externally (Nickell & Bell, 1995). Reductions in access to credit are therefore of little 
relevance for human capital investments, except for firms that are forced to turn to layoffs for 
liquidity reasons. For these firms, external finance becomes relevant if it can be used to avoid 
involuntarily layoffs, i.e. when the firm would have preferred to hoard labor. For firms that do 
not have incentives to hoard labor, ability to finance labor hoarding is irrelevant.  
Proposition 8: Investments in human capital are only sensitive to reduced credit 
availability if and when the firm is both dependent on credit and have incentives to hoard 
labor.  
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Net effects  
Since the demand effect is relevant as long as the firm has incentives to hoard labor, while 
the credit effect only applies when a binding credit constraint exists, the net effect of demand 
and credit will be equal to the demand effect up to the point where the ability to hoard labor 
depends on access to credit. From this point on the negative effect of recessions on human 
capital investments increases rapidly (see Figure 6). For less severe negative demand shocks, 
the positive demand effect implies a countercyclical relationship between recessions and 
human capital investments. Empirical studies have found this predicted countercyclical 
pattern of investments in human capital both on firm level (e.g. López-García et al., 2012), 
and on individual level in the form of increased college enrolments in recessions as 
individuals use their own excess capacity to accumulate skills in such periods (DeJong & 
Ingram, 2001; Dellas & Sakellaris, 2003; Heylen & Pozzi, 2007). Also, Geroski and Gregg 
(1997) found that firms were less likely to cut back on investments relating to training of their 
employees than other investments in the UK recession in the early 1990s. The discussion of 
human capital investments in recessions are summarized in Figure 6.  
[INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE] 
 
CONCLUSION 
The central premise of the present paper has been that the strategy literature has been 
virtually silent on the issue of recessions, and that this constitutes a regrettable sin of 
omission. Furthermore, we have argued that a key route to rectify this omission is to focus on 
how recessions affect investment behavior, and thereby firms stocks of assets and capabilities, 
which ultimately will affect competitive outcomes.  
The key contribution we have attempted to make here is at the front end of this link, that is, 
on how recessions affect investment behavior, while we have remained silent on the 
implications of our propositions for competitive outcomes. We believe a focus on how 
investment behavior is affected must come before a discussion of the ensuing consequences, 
which is why we have focused on investment and not performance consequences. 
Nevertheless, it seems pertinent to offer some illustrative thoughts on the implication for 
competitive outcomes in this concluding section. 
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For example, we have pointed out that under some circumstances recessions will have a 
positive effect on investments in human and organizational capital, since excess capacity can 
imply a de facto subsidy of the (opportunity) costs of making such investments. One might 
speculate that this will put pressure on competitive advantages that are founded on advantages 
in human- and organizational capital, for example if followers experience slightly more 
excess capacity than leaders. We can also speculate that this tendency will be stronger when 
incentives to hoard labor are strong. 
We have also pointed out that firms attempt to shield R&D investments in recessions, but 
that the ability to do so depends on financing constraints. A firm that cannot fully fund R&D 
internally will face serious cost increases as it turns to external finance for R&D, and if it 
cannot borrow to maintain R&D it must cut its investment. Because of the high adjustment 
costs of R&D, this could create a lasting negative effect on competitiveness. Consider the 
effects of this from a game theoretic perspective. It would seem likely that a firm barely able 
to keep up its R&D would make an inviting target for a more well financed competitor. If the 
stronger firm could lower the weaker firm’s margins slightly, it could inflict long lasting 
damage to its competitor by manipulating it to make irreversible cuts in R&D. 
In terms of physical investments, consider the fire sales mechanism (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1992, 2010). If there is excess capacity in an industry some firms might experience problems 
in keeping the collateral agreed with creditors. Those firms are then forced to sell assets. If 
there is a surplus of sellers relative to buyers, the firm will have to lower the price extensively 
to sell its asset. This turn revalues the collateral for all firms in the industry, leading more 
firms to problems with their collateral, which means still more firms will have to sell, pushing 
collateral values further down, etc. The result of such a process is that the price of physical 
assets - or other assets for that matter - can deviate substantially from their intrinsic value 
(expected net present value). A firm that can invest in physical capital at such dislocated 
prices can potentially lock in a significant advantage because it can obtain assets at prices 
levels that cannot be recreated unless a similar situation is recreated. 
More generally, we believe that the discussion here shows that some of the common 
background assumptions in strategy are highly problematic during recessions. For example, 
the strategy literature typically assumes that a number of markets are reasonably well 
functioning, most notably capital markets, so that positive NPV-investments will be financed. 
The business cycle literature in economics and finance provide ample evidence that this 
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assumption is violated during a recession, and this can have important implications for 
competitive behavior – investment behavior in particular.  
Another common background assumption in the strategy literature is that the ability to 
finance profitable investments does not vary across different asset types. I.e., while capital 
markets do assess the risk/return profile of different investments, there is no discrimination 
for or against tangible assets once the risk is taken into account. This means that firms are free 
to allocate their investments so that the expected marginal returns are equal across different 
asset types. Again, this is not necessarily the case during recessions. Since intangible assets 
are typically weaker collateral than physical capital, funding for intangible assets will be 
particularly difficult for firms that cannot finance these by retained profit (Aghion et al., 2008; 
Hall, 2002, 2010). So the more dependent you are on credit, the more difficult it will be to 
finance investments in intangibles and the more you will have to cut in such investments. 
Moreover, the incentives to invest during recessions will also vary across different asset types. 
As we have seen some investments become less attractive during periods of low demand, 
while other investments become relatively cheaper and hence more attractive during a 
recession  
In sum, then, recessions may cause serious distortions in both the level and composition of 
investment - factors that are important to competitive behavior and ultimately competitive 
outcomes. This is something strategy researchers cannot sweep under the rug if we want to 
understand the strategic implications of recessions.  
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1 Reductions in demand (investments opportunities) 
 
 
Figure 2 Reductions in demand (internal finance) 
 
 
SNF Working Paper No 03/13 
 
27 
 
 
Figure 3 Reductions in access to credit (increased cost of capital) 
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Figure 4 Net effects of demand and credit on physical investments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Net effects of demand and credit on R&D Investments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Net effects of demand and credit on Human Capital Investments 
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We argue that the strategy literature has been virtually silent on the issue of 
recessions, and that this constitutes a regrettable sin of omission. A key route 
to rectify this omission is to focus on how recessions affect investment behavior, 
and thereby firms stocks of assets and capabilities which ultimately will affect 
competitive outcomes. In the present paper we aim to contribute by analyzing 
how two key aspects of recessions, demand reductions and reductions in credit 
availability, affect three different types of investments: physical capital, R&D and 
innovation and human- and organizational capital. We point out that recessions 
not only affect the level of investment, but also the composition of investments. 
Some of these effects are quite counterintuitive. For example, investments in 
R&D are more sensitive to credit constraints than physical capital is. Investments 
in human capital grow as demand falls, and both R&D and human capital invest-
ments show important nonlinearities with respect to changes in demand. 
